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The Strength of Desires: A Logical Approach
Didier Dubois1 • Emiliano Lorini1 • Henri Prade1
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about 
desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, 
also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at 
the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to 
which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is 
different from the logic of beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce 
the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to 
increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed 
beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of 
desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing u _ w as a desire means to 
desire u and to desire w. However, desiring u and :u at the same time is not usually 
regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its 
contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an 
agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an 
epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment 
relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. 
While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be quali-tative necessity 
relations (in the sense of possibility theory), hedonic relations obeying a set of 
reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possi-bility theory, called 
guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the 
general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic
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setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be 
carefully distinguished from goals.
Keywords Desire  Revision  Possibility theory
1 Introduction
Desires constitute the primitive form of a motivational attitude that drives an agent 
to plan her action in order to satisfying them. Specifically, taking into account her 
beliefs about the world, the agent is able to choose what to do in the pursuit of her 
desires. The result of the agent’s choice constitutes her intentions to which she is 
then committed. Such a simplified schema is for instance advocated by Lorini 
(2014) taking inspiration from the philosophical and psychological literature 
(Castelfranchi and Paglieri 2007). These concepts are also the building blocks of so-
called BDI agents, where B, D, I, respectively stand for Beliefs, Desires, and 
Intentions (Rao and Georgeff 1991).
Desires and intentions are sometimes used more or less interchangeably in the 
literature. However, they should be carefully distinguished. For instance, let us 
reconsider an example adapted from Lang and van der Torre (2008): namely, an 
agent has a taste for (i.e., in this paper, a desire of) eating sushi. Today, she has the 
intention to go to restaurant ‘‘The Japoyaki’’ and to eat sushi (after making the 
choice of the restaurant on the basis of what she heard about). Then learning that the 
available sushi are made with fish that may be not fresh enough, she is led to revise 
her plans and to order something else. Here, her intention changes, although she 
keeps her taste (and, consequently, the desire) for sushi. In case she rather decides to 
go to another sushi restaurant, she would also revise her intention, but not her desire. 
In this paper, we do not consider intentions, but only desires.
Besides, when modeling desires the paper does not consider the case of unbearable 
situations for the agent, namely those she primarily wants to avoid or is afraid of. More 
precisely, we consider positive desires only, namely those that it would be really 
satisfactory to concretize, as opposed to negative desires (fears) corresponding to 
situations to be avoided because they are very unsatisfactory, or even unbearable for 
the agent. In fact, modelling both desires and the fear of unbearable situations would 
require a bipolar setting already discussed by Benferhat et al. (2006) and Dubois and 
Prade (2009b) leaving room for both positive and negative desires. Namely, the agent 
first tries to avoid being in a world that is insufferable for her, then she expresses 
desires among the remaining non-rejected worlds. Note that if a world is not rejected 
as unbearable or fearful, it does not mean that it is desired. The agent may just be 
indifferent about it. Cast in the bipolar setting, desires pertain to worlds the agent is at 
least indifferent to, and are not concerned with fear attitudes as caused by unbearable 
situations. This view is akin to prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
where gains and losses are separately handled by different utility functions. Here, we 
only focus on positive desires.
Moreover, desires and beliefs also behave differently. Indeed, as we shall claim in 
this paper, while believing u and believing w amounts to believing u ^ w, both
desiring u and desiring w amounts to desiring u _ w, and conversely. This is because
when an agent discovers new desires, it enlarges the number of desirable situations,
while accumulating beliefs reduces the number of possible worlds. This difference of
behavior between desire and belief has been pointed out by Casali et al. (2011), which
led them to propose possibility theory as a setting appropriate for modeling desires in
terms of guaranteed possibilities, while beliefs can be represented in terms of
necessity measures in this setting (Dubois and Prade 2009a). This point of view was
then investigated by Dubois et al. (2013), revisiting the representation of positive
preferences proposed earlier on by Benferhat et al. (2006).
We also claim that an agent cannot simply cumulate desires without never
making any revision, since it does not make sense to desire everything (at least
according to the wisdom of mankind). This means that sometimes an agent has to
revise her desires, not on the basis of some believed information about the state of
the world (including the possibility of being in an unbearable world), which would
trigger a change of intention, but just because of the activation of a new desire,
which, together with her previous desires, would lead her to desire anything and its
contrary. New desires may make previously desirable situations less attractive.
Such a situation is apparently similar to the revision of her beliefs by an agent
receiving a new piece of information that she considers to be true, since she has to
preserve the consistency of her beliefs. In (Dubois et al. 2015), a modeling of desire
change has been briefly outlined without proposing any axiomatic foundation nor
representation results. In this paper, we provide postulates for desire revision, contrast
them with belief revision postulates (Ga¨rdenfors 1988), and show how desire revision
(as well as expansion and contraction) can be implemented in possibility theory in
agreement with our postulates, both semantically and syntactically. This proposal
mirrors to a large extent the way belief change can be represented in the framework of
possibility theory (Dubois and Prade 1991, 1992; Benferhat et al. 2002b). Moreover,
note that belief revision in its original formulation does not consider impossibleworlds
(e.g., violating an integrity constraint). This is similar to the assumption of ruling out
unbearable situations in our desire modeling framework.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we highlight the main intuitions
behind the concept of desire in contrast with the concept of belief. Section 3 presents
an elementary approach for representing desires in a logical setting, from a syntactic
and semantical point of view, including a minimal modal logic representation.
Section 4 refines this setting by means of a desirability relation accounting for the
strength of desires, and provide axioms for such a relation. It is shown that the unique
numerical counterpart is a guaranteed possibility measure in the sense of possibility
theory. In Sect. 4.4, the representation of graded desires in this setting is presented in
detail. The guaranteed possibility distribution enables us to associate any set of desires
with a level of unacceptability, which is the counterpart of the level of inconsistency
for a set of beliefs represented in possibilistic logic. Section 5 provides axioms for
desire revision and then presents the revision of sets of prioritized desires
axiomatically, semantically, and syntactically using a special form of possibilistic
logic. Expansion and contraction of desires are also discussed.
This paper builds on several preliminary works. Dubois et al. (2013), following a
suggestion by Casali et al. (2011), investigated the use of a specific set function in
possibility theory (guaranteed possibility) for modeling the idea of desire, and
outline a modal logic for desire and beliefs. A simple version of this modal logic,
restricted to desires, is detailed in the present paper. In (Dubois et al. 2015), a
revision rule for desires was proposed, based on conditional guaranteed possibility
measures. More recently, axioms for comparative desire and desire revision were
proposed, with a preliminary discussion, in the workshop paper (Dubois et al.
2016). The present paper is a refined, updated, and completed synthesis, rewritten to
a large extent, of these preliminary contributions, including a discussion of the
relevant philosophical literature, and logical foundations.
2 Conceptual Foundation
An important and general distinction in the philosophy of mind is between epistemic
attitudes and motivational attitudes. This distinction is in terms of the direction of fit
of mental attitudes to the world. While the aim of epistemic attitudes is truth and
their being true refers to their conformity to the world as it stands, motivational
attitudes aim at realization and their realization consists in making the world fit
them (Platts 1979; Anscombe 1957; Humberstone 1992). Searle (1979) calls ‘‘mind-
to-world’’ the first kind of direction of fit and ‘‘world-to-mind’’ the second one.
Desire is representative of the family of motivational attitudes, while belief is
representative of the family of epistemic attitudes. Other kinds of motivational and
epistemic attitudes exist with different functions and properties such as preferences,
goals and moral values, knowledge and opinions (cf. Lorini 2014 for a logical
theory of the relationship between desires, moral values and preferences).
Beliefs are mental representations whose aim is to represent the physical, mental
and social worlds as they stand. In contrast, following the Humean conception
(Hume 1978), a desire can be viewed as an agent’s attitude consisting in an
anticipatory mental representation of a pleasant state of affairs (hedonic dimension
of desires) that motivates the agent to achieve it (motivational dimension of desires).
The motivational dimension of an agent’s desire is realized through its represen-
tational dimension, in the sense that, a desire motivates an agent to achieve it
because the agent’s representation of the desire’s content gives her pleasure by
anticipation. For example when an agent desires to eat sushi, she is pleased to
imagine herself eating sushi. This pleasant representation motivates her to go to the
‘‘The Japoyaki’’ restaurant in order to eat sushi. This view of desires unifies the
standard theory of desire (STD)—focused on the motivational dimension—and the
hedonic theory of desire (HTD)—focused on the hedonic dimension. A third theory
of desire has been advanced in the philosophical literature (see Schroeder 2004), the
so-called reward theory of desire (RTD). According to RTD what qualifies a mental
attitude as a desire is the exercise of a capacity to represent a certain fact as a
reward.1
1 According to Dretske (1988), desire is also a necessary condition for reward. In particular, desire
determines what counts as a reward for an agent. For example, a person can be rewarded with water only
if she is thirsty and she desires to drink.
Desire and belief have also different origins. Belief revision is triggered either via
direct sensing from the external environment (e.g., I believe that there is a fire in the
house since I can see it) or via communication (e.g., I believe that there is a fire in
the house since you told me this and I trust what you say). Desire change is triggered
under other conditions. In the case of human agents, these conditions might be
physiological or epistemic. For example, the desire of drinking a glass of water
could be activated by the feeling of thirst (physiological condition) and the desire of
going outside for a walk might be activated by the belief that it is a sunny day
(epistemic condition). In the case of artificial agents, conditions of desire activation
should be specified by the system’s designer. For example, a robotic assistant who
has to take care of an old person could be designed in such a way that every day at 4
pm the desire of giving a medicine to the old person is activated in its mind. This
highlights that belief change and desire change have different interpretations and
meanings.
From the AI perspective, having a formal theory of desires and desire change—
and desire revision, as a kind of desire change operation—is important for several
reasons: (i) desire is at the heart of the concept of autonomous agent, (ii) a theory of
desires and desire change is required to design artificial systems who are expected to
interact with humans in the appropriate way. Indeed, one important aspect of the
concept of autonomy is the fact of being endowed with a mechanism responsible for
the generation of internal motivations. From this perspective, an intelligent system
(e.g., a robot, a virtual agent) is autonomous insofar it can generate its own desires
on the basis of such a mechanism. Moreover, an artificial agent interacting with a
human should be capable of both ascribing desires to the human and understanding
how the desires of the human evolve over time.
Before going into the logical representation of desires and desire change, we
want to discuss two crucial properties of desires that drive our present analysis. The
first property is what we call the longing aspect of desires. The idea is that for an
agent to desire something, the agent should be in a situation in which she does not
have what she desires and she yearns for it. In other words, a state of affairs is
desired by an agent only if the agent conceives it as absent. The following quotation
from Locke (1975, Book II, Chap. XXI) makes this point clear:
To return then to the inquiry, what is it that determines the will in regard to our
actions? And that...is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view:
but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is at
present under. This that which successively determines the will, and sets us
upon those actions, we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it is, desire;
which is uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good...
This quotation seems to be at odds with what we claimed above, namely, that desire
is based on anticipatory pleasure. However, the anticipated pleasure associated with
a desire is all the stronger as its current lack of fulfillment—the term ‘‘uneasiness’’
in the previous quotation—is felt as more painful, as in the case of longing for a
drink when thirsty, for instance. So the contradiction is only apparent. This aspect of
uneasiness described by Locke should not be confused with the the concept of
aversion which is traditionally opposed to the concept of desire [see (Schroeder
2004, Chap. 5)]. As emphasized above, if an agent desires a certain fact to be true, 
then she has a mental representation of this fact motivating her to make the fact true 
and associated with a positive pleasant feeling. On the contrary, if an agent is averse 
to something, then she has a mental representation of certain fact motivating her to 
prevent the fact from being true and associated with a negative unpleasant feeling. 
The distinction between desire and aversion is not studied in the present paper. 
Indeed, the joint handling of both aspects requires a bipolar setting that, as 
emphasized in the introduction, goes beyond the scope of the present work.
The second property, called unconditional aspect of desires, reflects the idea that 
‘‘an agent desires something to be true, no matter the circumstances (assuming they 
are acceptable)’’, while other desires have a relative value in the sense that ‘‘an 
agent desires something to be true, conditional to some specific circumstances’’. For 
example, an agent may desire to drink red wine only in the circumstance in which 
she eats meat and, eventually, desire to drink white wine in the circumstances in 
which she eats fish or a dessert. In this sense, the desire to drink red wine is relative. 
On the contrary, another agent may enjoy drinking red wine, regardless of the 
proposed dishes. That is, she may desire to drink red wine while eating meat, fish or 
anything else. This kind of desire to drink red wine is unconditional.
The focus of the present paper concerns unconditional desires. It presupposes that 
the agent expresses desires in a sufficiently specific manner, e.g., expresses a joint 
desire for red wine and meat rather than for red wine at large, or rules out unpleasant 
situations where red wine is inappropriate, prior to expressing desires. Clearly, this 
model of desire has a limited scope. Going beyond these assumptions would require 
the explicit handling of relative and/or negative desires that is beyond the ambition 
of this paper. The study of relative desires calls for a nonmonotonic version of 
desires that we have started to investigate in Dubois et al. (2014).
Lastly, desires only express a general propensity, while goals are elements of a 
planning process aiming at making desired things true. For instance, the agent may 
have the desires to visit a Picasso exhibition and a Klee exhibition, which means 
that attending any of them will please her. When she organizes herself, she may 
adapt only the goal of visiting the Klee exhibition, which is the closest for her, due 
to a lack of time. In case she would have had more time, she might have taken the 
goal of visiting both exhibitions, which is clearly equivalent to the conjunction of 
the goal of visiting the Picasso exhibition and of the goal of visiting the Klee 
exhibition. Note that the desire of visiting both exhibitions has a different meaning: 
what is satisfactory in this latter case is to see both exhibitions, while it is not said if 
seeing only one of them would be satisfactory. Such a distinction between desires 
and goals has been already advocated in Castelfranchi and Paglieri (2007) and 
Lorini (2014).
Like for beliefs, any theory of desires should have a static aspect and a dynamic 
aspect. While the idea of coherence is at the root of a theory of rational beliefs (Rott 
2001) since a rational agent cannot endorse a contradictory set of beliefs, an agent 
cannot find desirable all the possible states of the worlds, since the agent should be 
in one of these states, and desires are only about what we do not have. This is one 
more clue in favor of the fact that beliefs and desires behave in opposite ways, as we
shall see. We first start with the static aspect of our steps to a logical theory of
desires.
3 A Logical Approach to Static Desires
In this section we move from an informal analysis to a formal analysis of all-or-
nothing desires, by showing how the static aspect of desires can be represented
either syntactically or semantically and how the two kinds of representations are
related.
3.1 A Syntactic Propositional Representation
Let Atm be a finite set of atomic propositions. Elements of Atm are denoted by
p; q; . . . We denote with LPL the propositional language built out of Atm.
Propositional sentences are denoted in the following by u, w, v or m. Hence :u,
u ^ w, u _ w belong to LPL as well. As usual > and ? denote the tautology and the
contradiction respectively; u! w ¼def :u _ w; u  w ¼def ðu! wÞ ^ ðw! uÞ.
‘ denotes syntactic entailment defined as usual. Notions of validity and satisfiability
are the standard ones from propositional logic.
In this paper, desires are represented by means of a finite set of propositional
sentences.
Definition 3.1 (Desire base) A desire base D is a finite subset of the language LPL.
It contains formulas called desires an agent would long for being true. Note that a
desire in u 2 D only reflects the taste for u being true, and does not mean to
actually plan to make it true. Equivalently a set of desires can be specified by its
characteristic function fD called a desire function that is, fDðuÞ ¼ 1 if u 2 D, and 0
otherwise. Note that in our framework, u 62 D means indifference about u being
true or not. It has no negative flavor like disgust or fear.
Definition 3.2 (Closed desire base) The desire base D is said to be closed iff it
satisfies the following properties:
(R1) if u is valid then u 62 D;
(R2) if w 2 D and u! w is valid then u 2 D;
(R3) if u 2 D and w 2 D then u _ w 2 D.
The class of closed desire bases is denoted by Dcl.
Let us justify these properties, since they generally differ from the usual notion of
closed set of formulas.
Property R1 is justified by the fact that agent cannot desire to achieve something
that is necessarily true and cannot be absent. Indeed, this is in contradiction with the
longing aspect of desires we have discussed in the previous section. There is no
point desiring the truth of tautologies, because you can only desire to make true
propositions that you believe to be false in your state of affairs, and tautologies are 
never believed so by a rational agent.
Property R2 is justified by the assumption of unconditional desires discussed in 
the previous section. Clearly, if an agent desires a certain proposition w to be 
unconditionally true, then all situations in which w is true should be desirable for the 
agent. Suppose u ! w is valid. Thus, all situations in which u is true are situations 
in which w is true. Consequently, if all situations in which w is true are desirable for 
the agent, then all situations in which u is true should be desirable for the agent. The 
latter means that the agent desires u. For instance, if an agent is satisfied by having a 
cup of coffee or a cup of tea, she should be satisfied by having a cup of coffee. This 
simple example clearly suggests that desires behave in a reverse way with respect to 
logical entailment. It justifies R2. Note that R2 for desires also echoes the difference 
of direction of fit of motivational attitudes for desires versus for epistemic attitudes 
and beliefs.
We have to keep in mind that desires are considered as tentative in nature, and 
have not reached the step of being adopted as goals to pursue. Here ‘desiring’ just 
means ‘finding pleasant’, ‘finding enjoyable’, ‘having a taste for’ and so on. The 
reverse entailment for desire also relies on the assumption that agents are 
omniscient, in the sense that, they desire all formulas that are (reversely) entailed by 
what they desire. This is similar to the omniscience assumption for beliefs. A logical 
theory of desires for non-omniscient agents goes beyond the scope of the present 
work.
There is an obvious objection to the reverse entailment for desires. Namely, 
desiring coffee does not imply desiring coffee while being in a very unpleasant 
situation, like having a close friend killed. It is clear that you would find this 
situation unbearable, even with a coffee. However, we have to recall that we do 
exclude unbearable situations. For instance, if the desire logic does not use 
propositional variables that refer to unbearable situations, an interpretation in this 
logic gathers an equivalence class of actual worlds some of which being possibly 
unbearable. However, the latter worlds cannot be expressed in the language; then 
they are implicitly assumed to be ruled out. Should some variables describe 
potentially unbearable situations, then we should use integrity constraints and 
restrict the rule R2 to potentially desirable interpretations.
R3 is an acceptable property of any deductively closed notion of desire. 
Informally it means that for example, longing for a cup of coffee (u) and longing for 
a cup of tea (w) logically entails longing for any of them (u _ w). Of course, u ^ w 
is also deduced, although trivially due to R2.
In contrast, for beliefs, deducing u ^ w is informative, and deducing u _ w is 
not. This has to do with the fact that models of desired formulas do not play the 
same role as models of believed formulas. Believing u comes down to 
considering as impossible all interpretations that make u false. All models of u 
are considered possible by the agent, but only one model of u is true. In contrast, 
desiring u comes down to considering as desirable all interpretations that make u 
true. So, believing u and w comes down to believing u ^ w (eliminating all 
interpretations where either of u and w is false). In contrast, desiring u and w
comes down to desiring u _ w (accumulating all interpretations where either of u
and w is true).2
Note that the behavior of desires with respect to logical entailment, as expressed
by axioms R1-3 is in full contrast with respect to beliefs, where believing u for an
agent entails that she believes w as well as soon as u ‘ w. This suggests that desires
obey a reverse entailment, namely a desire for w entails a desire for u, i.e., w ‘PLD
u if and only if u ‘ w. As a consequence, in the same way as u ‘ > trivially holds
for any belief u, we have w ‘PLD ? for any desire w. In other words, longing for no
state of affairs3 means to be in a dull state of mind4, just like believing tautologies is
bringing no useful information.
The following proposition highlights that if the desire base is closed then an
agent cannot desire u and its opposite.
Proposition 1 Let D 2 Dcl. Then, if u 2 D then :u 62 D.
Proof Suppose u 2 D and :u 2 D. Hence, by Property R3 in Definition 3.2,
ðu _ :uÞ 2 D. But, by Property R1 in Definition 3.2, ðu _ :uÞ 62 D. This leads to
a contradiction. h
Due to the blocking of direct entailment in the logic of desire, this property does
not rule the case where u;w 2 D with w ‘ :u. For instance, I may long for seeing a
Picasso exhibition in Paris and a Klee exhibition in New-York, which does not mean
that I desire to be in Paris and I desire not to be in Paris.5
The following proposition provides an equivalent formulation of the concept of
closed desire base.
Proposition 2 A desire base D is closed iff it satisfies Property R1 in
Definition 3.2 plus the following additional property:
(R2) if w1; . . .;wn 2 D and u! ðw1 _ . . . _ wnÞ is valid then u 2 D.
Proof The fact that R2 and R3 together imply R2 is clear. The fact that R2
implies R2 is also clear. Let us prove that R2 implies R3. Suppose u;w 2 D.
Clearly, ðu _ wÞ ! ðu _ wÞ is valid. Thus, by R2, u _ w 2 D. h
2 This is an example where the logical disjunction symbol _ should be read ‘‘and’’, in natural language,
as it translates into a set union, because the interpretations of u understood as a desire are not mutually
exclusive, contrary to when u represents a belief. In the case where u is a belief, the models of u are
mutually exclusive as candidates to be the real state of the world. So this set is a disjunction of situations,
while if u is a desire, any model of u is a desirable situation, and the set of models of u now collects all
desirable situations, thus making the set of models a conjunction of situations. See Dubois and Prade
(2012) and Zadeh (1978) for the importance of the distinction between the conjunctive and disjunctive
interpretations of sets in another area.
3 Remember that the set of models of ? is ;.
4 Called anhedonia as pointed out by a referee.
5 As noticed by a referee.
3.2 A Semantic Representation
We first present the notion of hedonic state, as opposed to the notion of volitive
state. We introduce this terminology, since volition is the name of the cognitive
process by which an agent decides on and commits to a particular course of action,
and since ultimately this process that takes into account the agent’s beliefs about the
world, relies on the desires of the agent. The semantic representation of desires is
based on the following concept of hedonic model.
Definition 3.3 (Hedonic model) A hedonic model is a tuple M ¼ ðW ; dÞ where
W ¼ 2Atm is the set of all interpretations6 and
d : W ! f0; 1g
is a desirability function such that dðwÞ ¼ 0 for some w 2 W . The set of interpre-
tations Dd ¼ fw : dðwÞ ¼ 1g is called a hedonic state.
At the intuitive level, dðwÞ ¼ 1 means that w is a desirable state, while dðw0Þ ¼ 0
indicates mere indifference towards w0, not rejection, as we do not model negative
desires nor the idea of loathing, fearing and the like.
Satisfaction of propositional desire formulas u with respect to interpretations
w 2 W is defined as usual, and denoted by w  u. Let jjujj  W denote the subset
of models of the propositional formula u. Based on the above discussion and the
disjunctive reading of joint desires, the set of models of a desire base D is
understood as the models of the disjunction of formulas in D ¼ fw1; . . .;wng, that
is,
jjfw1; . . .;wngjj ¼ jjw1jj [ . . . [ jjwnjj
with the convention jj;jj ¼ ;. The semantic inference for desires, denoted by D is
then defined by following the principle according to which if an agent desires a set
of possible worlds, she desires any subset of it, that is u D w if and only if
jjwjj  jjujj. The semantic entailment from a desire base D is expressed in a reverse
way compared to the usual one (for beliefs), namely,
D D w if and only if 8w 2 W ; if w  w then w  wi for some wi 2 D;
that is, for any desired situation according to w, there is a desired proposition in the
base which accounts for this desired situation. We do get that this is equivalent to
jjwjj  jjw1 [ . . . [ wnjj. Noticeably, u D w if and only if w  u in the usual
sense. Validity is then defined as D w if and only if jjwjj ¼ ;. In fact, this semantic
inference preserves falsehood, since it can also be expressed as:
D D w if and only if 8w 2 W ; if w  :wi for all wi 2 D then w  :w:
In other words, we have that
6 For simplicity, we assume that W does not contain unbearable interpretations.
D D w if and only if w 
_n
i¼1
wi if and only if D:  :w ð1Þ
where D: ¼ f:wi : wi 2 Dg. Note the close relationship between property R2
 and
the above equivalence.
3.3 Axiomatization
On this basis we are in a position to propose a counterpart to propositional logic for
desires, via the following inference system:
Axioms:
ð:PLÞ :
1. :ðu! ðw! uÞÞ;
2. :ððu! ðw! lÞÞ ! ððu! wÞ ! ðu! lÞÞÞ;
3. :ðð:u! :wÞ ! ðw! uÞÞ.
Inference rule
ðCMPÞ :
u;:u ^ w
w
The axioms of this propositional logic of desires (PLD) are those of propositional
logic, negated to account for R1. The syntactic rule that preserves falsehood is
precisely (CMP) (while the standard modus ponens preserves truth) since (CMP)
can be read : if u is false and :u ^ w is false, then w is false.
The soundness and completeness of this propositional logic of desires can be
obtained based on equivalences (1).
Theorem 1 The propositional logic of desires PLD defined by axioms :PL and
inference rule CMP is sound and complete with respect to the semantic entailment
D.
Proof Using (1), D D w if and only if D:  :w, and due to completeness of the
propositional calculus, this is equivalent to D: ‘ :w in PL. Finally, one can define a
one-to-one translation of every proof (in the usual sense) in classical logic of D: ‘
:u into a proof in PLD of D ‘PLD u. Indeed, if /1; . . .;/n; where /n ¼ :u is a
proof of :u from D: in PL, then :/1; . . .;:/n ¼ u is a proof of u from D in PLD,
replacing each application of modus ponens by an application of CMP to the
negated premisses. And vice-versa. h
There is a noticeable inference rule that is admissible in PLD, namely a form of
weakening rule for desires:
ðDWÞ : u ‘PLD u ^ w:
Indeed, since :u  :u _ :w, we do have that u D u ^ w using (1), hence ðDWÞ
holds using the completeness theorem; this is the desire counterpart of the weak-
ening rule / ‘ / _ w in classical logic.
Clearly, property R2 is exactly encoded by inference rule ðDWÞ. As for R3, we
can prove it in PLD if we restrict D to the negation of propositional axioms, using
the fact that u is a theorem of PLD if and only if :u is a theorem of LP in the usual
sense. Then since ‘ :u and ‘ :w imply ‘ :u ^ :w, we do get that ‘PLD u and
‘PLD w imply ‘PLD u _ w.
More generally, the inference from a set of desires D can be based on the
following rule of resolution, which is the desire counterpart of the resolution rule for
beliefs (namely, fu _ w;:u _ mg ‘ w _ m), that clearly extend CMP:
ðDRÞ :
u ^ w;:u ^ m
w ^ m
Proposition 3 The resolution rule ðDRÞ is admissible in PLD.
Proof It is obvious, applying (1) and the completeness theorem to D ¼ fu ^
w;:u ^ mg and the usual resolution rule to D: ¼ f:u _ :w;u _ :mg, which
enables :w _ :m to be derived. h
We thus get a propositional logic of desires that is a mirror image of the usual
propositional logic (of beliefs).
Besides the application of the resolution rule DR in refutation style for desire
bases, denoted by ‘DR, is sound and complete with respect to semantic entailment
D D w:
Theorem 2 D D w if and only if D [ f:wg ‘DR > .
Proof Given a desire base D, build the propositional base D: ¼ f:wi : wi 2 Dg.
Then D D w if and only if D:  :w if and only if D: [ fwg ‘ ? using the PL
resolution rule, if and only if D [ f:wg ‘DR > using the resolution rule for desires
DR. h
3.4 A Minimal Modal Logic of Desires
The idea that an agent desires some state of affairs u to be true if and only if all
situations in which u is true are desirable can be expressed by means of the
following modal operator.
Definition 3.4 (Desire operator) Let M ¼ ðW ; dÞ be a hedonic model, and let
u 2 LPL. Then:
M  Du () 8w 2 W : if w  u then dðwÞ ¼ 1
M  Du means that the hedonic state Dd contains the set of models of u. Note 
that the desire operator works in a reverse way compared to a standard necessity 
operator in modal logic. This type of modal operator was introduced in Dubois et al.
(2000) in the setting of possibility theory.
In this section, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for the minimal 
modal logic of desires (MLD) whose language LPL
D contains atoms of the form Du
for all propositional formulas u 2 LPL and their propositional combinations via :
and ^.
The crucial thing to observe is that the satisfaction relation for the desire operator
D for the hedonic model M ¼ ðW ; dÞ can be reformulated in a equivalent way as
follows:
M  Du() 8w 2 W : if dðwÞ ¼ 0 then w  :u
This means that the formula Du can be seen as an abbreviation of h:u, where h is
a normal modal operator of type KD, and ðW ; dÞ  Du is equivalent to
ðW ; 1 dÞ  h:u, where 1 d is the characteristic function of an epistemic state
(a non-empty subset E of W). Consequently, to provide a sound and complete
axiomatization of the logic MLD, it is sufficient to borrow the principles of the
normal modal system KD, where each instance of a formula hu is replaced by
D:u. In fact, only the simple fragment of KD encoding the all-or-nothing version of
possibility theory in (Banerjee and Dubois 2014) is needed. This is what the next
theorem highlights.
Theorem 3 The following four principles plus Modus Ponens provide a sound and
complete axiomatization of the logic MLD:
PL Axioms of Propositional logic for expressions in LPL
D;
Kc Dð:u ^ wÞ ! ðDu! DwÞ;
Nc If ‘ :u, then Du
Dc Du! :D:u.
Proof The proof is a straightforward adaption of the completeness proof for
minimal epistemic logic (MEL) given in Section 3 of Banerjee and Dubois (2014),
since MLD is identical to MEL once we change Du into h:u. h
The first modal axiom is the desire-based translation of Axiom K, while the
second corresponds to Axiom N, and the third one to axiom D. Axiom Kc means
that if you desire worlds where :u ^ w is true and moreover you desire worlds
where u is true, then you also desire worlds where w is true (indeed, w!
ð:u ^ wÞ _ u is valid). Interestingly, this logic exactly corresponds to the data-
driven modal logic previously proposed by two of the authors with Hajek (Dubois
et al. 2000), as a counterpart of KD45. This is because guaranteed possibility
measures have an epistemic understanding in terms of observations made, that
parallels the representation of desires. However, MLD uses only a fragment of the
language in (Dubois et al. 2000) and the semantics of MLD is simpler as it does not
use accessibility relations.
The three following principles are valid in MLD (see (Banerjee and Dubois 2014)
for the proof of their counterparts):
1. ðDu ^ DwÞ  Dðu _ wÞ;
2. :D>;
3. Dw! Du whenever ‘ u! w in propositional logic.
The first principle is the translation of the adjunction rule and the third principle
corresponds to the so-called rule of monotony (RM) in the logic KD. They
respectively correspond to the properties R3, R1 and R2 in Definition 3.2.
Finally if we restrict the language LPL
D to conjunctions of atoms Du, we get a
copy of the propositional logic of desires of the previous Sect. 3.2:
Corollary 1
Vn
i¼1Dui ‘MLD Du if and only if fu1; . . .;ung ‘PLD u.
Proof This is the desire counterpart of Theorem 2 in Banerjee and Dubois (2014).
Note that
Vn
i¼1 Dui is equivalent to D _
n
i¼1 ui, and
Vn
i¼1 Dui ‘MLD Du is the same
as u  _ni¼1ui in classical logic. h
This result shows the complete agreement of the minimal modal logic of desires
MLD with our view of a closed propositional desire base in Definition 3.2.
4 Graded Hedonic States: from Desirability Relations to Possibility
Theory
In this section, hedonic states will be described by means of an ordering relation 
acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of relative strength. This relation 
should obey particular axioms, and has guaranteed possibility measures (Dubois and 
Prade 1998) as a unique numerical counterpart, as we shall see. This leads to 
representing a gradual hedonic state by means of a guaranteed possibility 
distribution, thus extending the framework of the previous section. In this section, 
we represent propositions by subsets of possible worlds A; B; C. . .  W which form 
a (finite) Boolean algebra }ðWÞ.
4.1 Axioms for Desirability Relations
Desires are a matter of strength. Some situation may be more strongly desired than 
another one by an agent. Thus, the hedonic state of an agent will be described by an 
ordering relation on }ðWÞ, denoted by  D, called desirability relation. Such a 
relation compares subsets of W representing propositions in terms of satisfaction the 
agent expects from them if made true. A  D B should be read ‘‘A is at least as 
desirable as B’’; it means that concretizing A should be at least as satisfactory as 
concretizing B, or if we prefer that A is at least as desired as B, which reflects a 
gradual view of desire. As usual, A [ D B when A  D B but not B  D A; and 
A 	 D B means A  D B and B  D A.
The previous discussions in the Boolean case leads to propose that  D should 
satisfy the following axioms:
(A0) ; [D W
(A1) A  D B or B  D A
(A2) A  D B and B  D C imply A  D C
(AM) if A  B, then A  D B
(Pos) 8A, if B  D C then A [ B  D A [ C
Admitting that desires behave in a reverse way with respect to entailment, the anti-
monotonicity axiom (AM) is natural, and (A0) expresses the corresponding non
triviality condition. Axiom (AM) implies the limit condition
ðA3Þ : ;  D A:
The other axioms are perfectly neutral with respect to a reverse, or a normal,
behavior with respect to entailment. Axioms (A1) and (A2) simply say that relation
 D is complete and transitive respectively. Axiom (Pos) states that if ‘‘B is at least
as desirable as C’’, this preference in the broad sense cannot be altered by enlarging
the scope of the comparison on both sides in the same way by A. Indeed if you find
more desirable (in the broad sense) to drink tea than to drink coffee, then you should
find at least as desirable to drink tea or orange juice as to drink coffee or orange
juice (even if your actual preference is for orange juice). Axiom (Pos) that makes
sense for desires can be encountered in other modeling problems such as conditional
logics and comparative possibility theory (Lewis 1973; Dubois 1986)
The following result is worth noticing:
Proposition 4 Under (Pos), (A3) implies (AM).
Proof By (A3), ;  D B nA and applying (Pos), we get A  D B. h
So desirability relations are characterized as well by (A0)–(A3) and (Pos).
Desirability Relations Versus Epistemic Entrenchments It is worth noticing that the
set of axioms (A0)–(A3) and (Pos) depart from the ones characterizing epistemic
entrenchment relations  epis that underly any well-behaved belief revision process
(Ga¨rdenfors 1988; Rott 2001). It has been established that epistemic entrenchment
relations are nothing but comparative necessity relations  N up to a minor
difference, namely axiom W[ N; is strengthened into W[epis A; 8A 6¼ W ; for
epistemic entrenchments (Dubois and Prade 1991), which means that no state of
affairs is impossible. Comparative necessity relations (and thus epistemic
entrenchment relations) satisfy (A1) and (A2), but they obey counterparts of the
other axioms, namely
(A00): W[N ;
(A03) A  N ;; 8A.
(Nec) If A  N B then A\C  N B\C:
The latter is the characteristic property of comparative necessity relations. Under
axioms (A00)–(A1)–(A2)–(A03), (Nec) is equivalent to
if A  N B then A \ B 	 N B;
where A  N B means that A is at least as certain as B (Dubois 1986).
By duality, comparative necessity relations  N are associated with comparative
possibility relations P through the equivalence AP B, B N A, where A is the
complement of A. Comparative possibility relations (Dubois 1986) satisfy axioms
(A00), (A1)–(A2), together with axiom (Pos). It is remarkable that switching from
comparative possibility relations to desirability relations comes down to only
changing axioms ‘‘W[P ;’’ and ‘‘AP ;’’ for comparative possibility into
A0 (;[DW) and (A3) (;D A) for desirability relations.
4.2 Properties of Desirability Relations
The set of axioms (A0)–(A3) and (Pos) entail noticeable properties for desirability
relations that agree with intuition. First, we can establish the following result, which
parallels a counterpart for comparative possibility relations in Dubois (1986).
Proposition 5 Under axioms (A0)–(A3), axiom (Pos) is equivalent to
ðDÞ if A  D B then A[B 	 D B:
Proof (D) ) (Pos).
Assume B  D C.
• If A  D B  D C, A[B 	 D B  D C 	 D A[C;
• If B  D A  D C, A[B 	 D A  D C 	 D A[C;
• If B  D C  D A, A[B 	 D A  D A 	 D A[C.
(D) follows by transitivity. Note that we do not use (A3).
(Pos) ) (D).
Suppose A  D B. Then, by (Pos), A[C  D B[C, in particular A[B  D B.
Now by (A3), ;  D A and applying (Pos), we get B  D A[B. h
Clearly, (D) expresses that desiring A [ B has the same strength as desiring the
least desired of A and B. The strength of desire for A [ B is conservatively evaluated
by the least desired situation realizing it because at the moment of its realization
there may be constraints restricting the choice of the possible world that makes
A [ B fulfilled. For instance, if the agent desires coffee (A) more strongly than tea
(B), the strength of desiring coffee and tea is the least of the two desires, because she
does not know in advance which one of coffee or tea will be available for drinking
at the time where this desire is to be made true. So the axioms of comparative
desirability carry a flavor of safeness. Then, it seems intuitively satisfactory that the
strength of desire of A [ B should be at most equal to the minimum of the desire
strengths of A and B (when dealing with positive desires), since fulfilling A [ B may
let me not better off than fulfilling any of them.
Proposition 6 Under axioms (A0)-(A3) and (Pos)
a Either A 	 DW or A 	 DW or both.
b 8A;A  DW .
Proof
a It is an immediate consequence of (A2) and (D), since letting B ¼ A in (D), we
get W 	 D A if A  D A, and W 	 D A if A  D A.
b Since 8A; 8C;A  D A[C, letting C ¼ A yields the result.
hProposition 6 states that one cannot desire A and A at the same time, at least one
the two options should not be desired more than what is the least desired, which is
the tautology, whose desirability is minimal as stated by Property b.
4.3 From Desirability Relations to Possibility Theory
We have seen that an ordering relation obeying axioms (A0)–(A3) and (Pos) may be
appropriate for modeling (positive) desirability in a relative way. A natural question
is then to wonder what are the absolute scale-valued functions measuring the
strength of desire, if any, that can represent desirability relations.
A numerical function F from }ðWÞ to [0, 1] is said to represent a relation  R if
8A;B;AR B, FðAÞFðBÞ. In the following, we assume that the set W of
associated interpretations of the considered language, with subsets A, B, etc., is
finite.
The only numerical functions compatible with the desirability relation ordering
 D are so-called guaranteed possibility measures
7 (Dubois et al. 2000; Dubois and
Prade 2009b) in the sense of possibility theory, as shown now. A guaranteed
possibility measure D, from }ðWÞ to [0, 1], is characterized by the limit conditions
Dð;Þ ¼ 1 and DðWÞ ¼ 0, and by the decomposability property:8
DðA [ BÞ ¼ minðDðAÞ;DðBÞÞ; 8A;B 2 }ðWÞ: ð2Þ
Proposition 7 Any numerical function F, from }ðWÞ to [0, 1], representing an
ordering relation  D obeying axioms (A0)–(A3) and (Pos) is a guaranteed
possibility measure. Conversely, any guaranteed possibility measure from a
Boolean algebra }ðWÞ to [0, 1] satisfying Dð;Þ[DðWÞ induces a qualitative
relation satisfying (A0)–(A3) and (Pos).
Proof ()) From Proposition 5, any set-function D representing  D must be such
that DðA [ BÞ ¼ minðDðAÞ;DðBÞÞ since A[B 	 D B whenever A  D B. As
;  D A  DW and  D is antimonotonic (item a of Proposition 6), and moreover
;>DW by (A0), one can fix DðWÞ ¼ 0 and Dð;Þ ¼ 1, with DðAÞ 2 ½0; 1
.
(() Conversely, a guaranteed possibility measure, in a finite setting, is based on
a distribution d such that DðAÞ ¼ minw2A dðwÞ, and it is easy to check that it induces
an ordering relation that satisfies axioms (A0)–(A3) and (Pos). h
7 The term guaranteed comes from the fact that in possibility theory, DðAÞ ¼ 1 means that all instances
of A can actually be observed. It contrasts with potential possibility, which takes value 1 as soon as one
instance of A is observed.
8 This equality is the same as the one that Spohn ranking functions j (Spohn 2012) satisfy, but
identifying D and j would be misleading: D and j are antimonotonic with inclusion, but the ranges of D
and j, respectively [0, 1] and N (non-negative integers) are directed in opposite ways: jðAÞ ¼ 0
expresses full possibility, and the higher jðAÞ the more A is impossible, while DðAÞ ¼ 1 expresses full
possibility. When mapping N to [0, 1] via an order-reversing function (e.g., f ðAÞ ¼ 2jðAÞÞ, we obtain an
increasing maxitive function: f ðA [ BÞ ¼ maxðf ðAÞ; f ðBÞÞ, which departs from the characteristic
property of D.
This proposition states that the only numerical functions agreeing with a
qualitative ordering  D are those obeying decomposability property (2). Note that
the range [0, 1] may be replaced by any linearly ordered, possibly finite, scale.
Finally, we can define a function d : W ! ½0; 1
, expressing the strength of desire
of possible worlds, that characterizes the set-function D:
Corollary 2 8A 6¼ ;; 9w 2 A; fwg 	 D A.
Proof Suppose A ¼ fw1; . . .;wkg and w1  D. . .;  D wk. It is clear from Propo-
sition 5 that since fwkg is the least element in A,
wk 	 Dfwk;wk1g	 Dfwk;wk1;wk2g 	 D A:
h
Namely, the gradual desirability function d can be defined as dðwÞ ¼ DðfwgÞ. It
satisfies a normality constraint dðwÞ ¼ 0 for some w 2 W since DðWÞ ¼ 0. It is such
that
DðAÞ ¼ min
w2A
dðwÞ: ð3Þ
The function d is usually called a guaranteed possibility distribution (Dubois et al.
2000; Dubois and Prade 2009b); its range [0, 1], can more generally be any linearly
ordered scale S. Here, dðwÞ represents the degree of desirability of a given world
w 2 W . Obviously, the binary function dk such that dkðwÞ ¼ 1 if dðwÞ k and 0
otherwise is a desirability function in the sense of Sect. 3.
Our results thus show that we can interpret guaranteed possibility measures D in
terms of (guaranteed) desirability. Namely, DðAÞ is the extent to which the agent
can safely desire proposition A to be true (safely in the sense that, no matter how
A is fullfilled, the expected level of satisfaction is at least DðAÞ). As a consequence
of Proposition 5, we have
minðDðAÞ;DðAÞÞ ¼ DðWÞ ¼ 0
which is the numerical counterpart of property b in Proposition 6, which is
DðAÞ[ 0 then DðAÞ ¼ 0. This means that if an agent safely desires A to be true—
i.e., with some strength a[ 0—then she does not safely desire at all A to be false.
This is a form of consistency requirement also expressed by normality constraint of
d ensuring that not everything can be desired.
Besides,
DðA \ BÞ  maxðDðAÞ; DðBÞÞ:
This is the consequence that D is decreasing with respect to entailment (i.e., Axiom 
AM). This makes perfect sense for motivational attitudes like desires, as suggested 
by the following example.
Example Suppose Paul has a taste for cheese with strength a (i.e., 
Dðeat cheeseÞ ¼ a) and, at the same time, he likes to drink wine with strength b 
(i.e., Dðdrink wineÞ ¼ b). Then, according to the preceding property, Paul likes to
eat cheese and drink wine with strength at least maxða; bÞ (i.e.,
Dðeat cheese ^ drink wineÞ maxða; bÞ). This is a reasonable conclusion because
the situation in which Paul achieves his two desires is (for Paul) at least as pleasant
as the situation in which he achieves only one desire.
One might object that if it is generally the case that satisfying simultaneously two
desires is at least as good as satisfying one of them, there may exist exceptional
situations where it is not the case. Just imagine, in the above example, the case
where the wine is corked, and so Paul would not like to drink it with his cheese. One
way out is to restrict desires to good wines explicitly. One referee replaced cheese
by beer in the above example, which then becomes a counterexample as one usually
does not like to drink beer and (even good) wine together.9 In our framework one
way to avoid this situation is to explicitly say wine alone (i.e., without beer) and
beer alone (this is what people usually mean when they say they like beer or wine).
It means that in D we find both wine ^:beer and beer ^:wine. Alternatively if wine
together with beer is a rejected option, it pertains to negative desires that must be
expressed prior to describing positive desires.
Such exceptions could be also coped with by means of non-monotonic desires;
see Dubois et al. (2014) for a preliminary proposal in the possibilistic reasoning
setting, but this is out of the scope of the present paper. In that approach, one could
say that in the beer context no wine is desired, in the wine context no beer is desired,
and that ‘‘wine or beer’’ is desired, i.e., A\B>D A\B, B\A>D A\B, and
A[B>D A\B, which are compatible constraints.
4.4 Modeling Desires in Possibilistic Logic
As suggested in Casali et al. (2011), and taken up in Dubois et al. (2014), a desire A
with strength a is properly represented by a constraint of the form DðAÞ a which
stands for ‘‘the agent desires A with strength at least a’’. If A is the set of models of a
formula u, it can be syntactically represented by a pair ½w; a
. The corresponding
desirability function d½w;a
 onW is defined as d½w;a
ðwÞ ¼ a if w  w and 0 otherwise.
It is the smallest possibility distribution such that DðjjwjjÞ  a, according to a
maximum specificity principle. This principle says that it is cautious not to assume
that models of u are desired to a strength greater than a, while no countermodels of
w are desired by lack of information that some of them would be.
Generalizing the logical setting of Sect. 3.1, a desire function will be defined by a
function fD : LPL ! ½0; 1
 (more generally, a bounded, totally ordered chain of
levels). A desire function will then induce a prioritized desire base, first introduced
in Benferhat et al. (1999) (see also Benferhat and Kaci 2003 for an extensive
presentation). Specifically, the prioritized desire base D induced by the desire
function fD is a collection of weighted formulas ½wi; ai
 where fDðwiÞ ¼ ai,
equivalently a collection of nested desire sets ðDkÞk2½0;1
 such that for all k 2 ½0; 1
:
9 Note that wine and cheese are complementary, while beer and wine can be viewed as redundant, and
thus less jointly desirable.
Dk ¼ fu 2 LPL : fDðuÞ kg
The possibilistic logic of desires does not obey the same inference rules as the
possibilistic logic of beliefs. Indeed now the resolution rule DR for desires writes in
its weighted version:
ðDRwÞ: From ½u ^ w; a
 and ½:u ^ m; b
 deduce ½w ^ m;minða; bÞ
:
A set D of weighted desires ½wi; ai
 (for i ¼ 1; . . .;m) is semantically associated to a
guaranteed possibility distribution
dDðwÞ ¼ max
i¼1;...;m
minðjjwijjðwÞ; aiÞ: ð4Þ
where jjwijjðwÞ ¼ 1 if w is a model of wi, and jjwijjðwÞ ¼ 0 otherwise. dD is again
the smallest possibility distribution such that DðjjwijjÞ  ai for i ¼ 1; . . .;m, using a
minimal commitment principle: there is no other desire than those expressed in the
desire set D. The use of max is justified by taking the set union of the sets of models
of weighted formulas in the graded desire base D, in agreement with the semantics
of the propositional logic of desires outlined in Sect. 3.2. The distribution dD rank-
orders the interpretations of the language induced by the wi’s according to their
satisfaction level on the basis of the strength of the desires in D. A hedonic state can
then be viewed as a fuzzy (or graded) subset of worlds.
The quantity
unaðDÞ ¼ min
w
dDðwÞ
may be viewed as a level of inconsistency of D. The larger unaðDÞ, the more
inconsistent (that is to say, unacceptable) the set of desires D. Ideally,
minw dDðwÞ ¼ 0 should hold, in which case, the desire base D is consistent.
Desires Versus Beliefs in Possibility Theory The above modeling of graded desire
bases contrasts with the representation of graded beliefs that is properly represented
by a constraint of the form NðAÞ a which stands for ‘‘the agent believes A with
strength at least a’’. Function N is a necessity measure (Dubois and Prade 1998)
defined from a possibility distribution p : W ! ½0; 1
 by
NðAÞ ¼ 1max
w 62A
pðwÞ:
This expression is the counterpart for beliefs of expression (3) for desires. A pos-
sibility distribution p represents a graded epistemic state, such that pðwÞ ¼ 0 means 
that world w is ruled out by our information. The degree N(A) estimates the extent to 
which the agent believes A to be true, all the more as its complement is found 
impossible in the sense of p. Indeed, the necessity measure of N is the dual of the 
possibility measure P, namely PðAÞ ¼ 1  NðAÞ (where A is a complement of A). 
Beliefs, modeled by means of necessity measures, satisfy
NðA \ BÞ ¼ minðNðAÞ;NðBÞÞ
i.e., believing A and B amounts to believing A and to believing B. It is easy to see
that
NðAÞ ¼ min
w 62A
1 pðwÞ ¼ DðAÞ ¼ min
w 62A
dðwÞ
if p ¼ 1 d. That is, at a purely mathematical level, a necessity measure is closely
related to a guaranteed possibility measure.
Desire bases can be contrasted with the possibilistic representation of a belief
base B expressed in possibilistic logic (Dubois and Prade 2004). Then, a set of
weighted formulas ðuj; cjÞ (for j ¼ 1; . . .; n) encodes constraints of the form
NðjjujjjÞ  cj. B is semantically associated with a possibility distribution
pBðwÞ ¼ min
j¼1;...;n
maxðjjujjjðwÞ; 1 cjÞ:
This expression is to be compared with (4) for desire bases. Here, pB is the largest
(least committed) possibility distribution (minimum specificity principle) such that
NðujÞ cj for j ¼ 1; . . .; n. The distribution pB rank-orders the interpretations of the
language induced by the uj’s according to their plausibility on the basis of the
strength of the beliefs in B. As clear in the expression of pB, a belief set is underlain
by a (weighted) conjunction of the pieces of beliefs, while in (4) a desire set should
be understood as a disjunction of formulas, in agreement with the intuition.
If the set of beliefs B ¼ fuj; j ¼ 1; . . .; ng is consistent then the distribution pB
is normalized in the sense that 9w; pBðwÞ ¼ 1. More generally the level of
inconsistency of B is defined by incðBÞ ¼ 1maxw pBðwÞ. Thus the degree of
inconsistency unaðDÞ should play the same role in desire revision as incðBÞ in belief
revision (Benferhat et al. 2001; Benferhat et al. 2002b).
The weighted resolution rule for desires (DRw) contrasts with the better known
resolution rule for prioritized beliefs: ðu _ w; aÞ and ð:u _ m; bÞ entails ðw _
m;minða; bÞÞ (Dubois and Prade 2004) and follows from it by transforming weighted
beliefs ðu; aÞ into weighted desires of the form ½:u; a
.
4.5 Related Work
An area of research which looks related to our work is preference logic. According
to contemporary theories of human motivation both in philosophy and in
economics (e.g., Searle 2001; Harsanyi 1982, 1955), preferences of a rational agent
may originate either (1) from somatically-marked motivations such as desires (e.g.,
the preference for a glass of lemonade over a cappuccino originates from the desire
of drinking something fresh), or (2) from moral considerations and values (e.g., the
preference for helping a poor person, over ignoring her, originates from the moral
value of taking care of needy people). More generally, there exist desire-dependent
preferences and desire-independent ones originated from moral values.10 Accord-
ing to this view, desires and moral attitudes of an agent are two different
parameters affecting the agent’s preferences. Although, from a conceptual point of
view, desire—our object of analysis—is more primitive than preference, existing
preference logics share similarities with our approach.
In his seminal work on preference logic (Von Wright 1963, 1972), Von Wright
studied dyadic preferences of the form ‘‘I prefer u over w’’ by giving a ceteris
paribus interpretation of this notion. Specifically, according to Von Wright, u is
preferred to w if and only if, all other things being equal, any situation in which u is
true is preferred to any situation in which w is true. A modal logic account of Von
Wright’s notion of preference has been recently proposed by van Benthem et al.
(2009) who generalize previous work by van Benthem and Liu (2007). They use a
total preorder on a set of possible worlds for modelling preferences. A main
difference with our work is that the preference relation on possible worlds does not
convey any positive nor negative flavor. No world is considered good or bad, only
some worlds are preferred to other ones, without absolute judgements about them.
In particular, in the paper, there are several ways of lifting the preference relation
over to formulas that are equally good and useful. On the contrary, as we consider
that desire has a positive flavor, we advocate, via axioms, one way of lifting the
desirability relation between worlds to formulas. In our approach, relative desires
w Du express the idea that the least desired model of w is not worse than the least
desired model of w; this is less demanding, and we do not make the preferential
independence assumption implicit in the ceteris paribus method. Doyle et al.
(1991) also consider relative desires wu that hold if any w-world is preferred to
any u-world expressed with propositional variables appearing in u and w,
completed by a ceteris paribus condition for other propositional variables. Again
their notion of relative desire does not seem to differ much from relative preference.
Since in the present work we do not model negative desires (whereby a certain
fact u would be undesirable with a certain strength k), our semantics in terms of
possibility distributions over [0, 1] and Van Benthem’s qualitative semantics are not
equivalent with respect to our notion of desire. Negative desires are not expressible
together with positive desires by using a single total preorder over interpretations.
We would need a second preference relation expressing fears or unsatisfactory
worlds
Lang et al. (2002) study conditional desires of the form DðujwÞ that put a
penalty on interpretations where w is true and u is false and a reward on
interpretations where w and u are true. Penalties and rewards are supposed to add
and lead to the construction of a utility function on possible worlds (Lang and van
10 This distinction leads to the identification of two different kinds of moral dilemmas. The first kind of
moral dilemma is the one which is determined by the logical conflict between two moral values. The 
paradigmatic example is the situation of a soldier during a war. As a member of the army, the soldier feels 
obliged to kills his enemies, if this is the only way to defend his country. But, as a catholic, he thinks that 
human life should be respected. Therefore, he feels morally obliged not to kill other people. The other 
kind of moral dilemma is the one which is determined by the logical conflict between desires and moral 
values. The paradigmatic example is that of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden. They are tempted by 
the desire to eat the forbidden fruit and, at the same time, they have a moral obligation not to do it.
der Torre 1996). In contrast, our approach is qualitative (satisfaction degrees do not
add), unconditional and focuses on positive desires (there is a positive effect of
satisfying u, no negative effect in not satisfying it) because we consider negative
desires (fears) should be handled using a different formalism, even if articulated
with desires.
5 Desire Revision
Revision in logic has mainly considered belief sets. In the dominant AGM view
described by Ga¨rdenfors (1988), a belief set is just a collection of propositional
sentences (assumed to be closed by logical entailment), while the revision process is
driven by an epistemic entrenchment relation that is not an explicit part of the
epistemic state of the agent.11 Namely the epistemic state of the agent is described
from the outside. The observer only sees the agent belief set, not the entrenchment.
He sees the agent beliefs evolve due to inputs. The belief revision axioms are a
model of the principles guiding the potential changes of the belief set. The study
concludes that belief changes occur as if there were an epistemic entrenchment
driving the process.
A more practical approach (Benferhat et al. 2002b) views epistemic states as a
prioritized collection of pieces of belief, which are thus associated to priorities that
enable us to compute their entrenchment level as the value of a necessity measure.
In this section we study the counterpart of the AGM theory of belief
change (Ga¨rdenfors 1988) for desires using closed desired sets, and then weighted
desire bases.
5.1 Axioms for Desire Revision
In this subsection, we only consider desire sets D, understood as closed desire bases,
namely such that if w 2 D and u ‘PLD w then u 2 D, if u 2 D, w 2 D then
u _ w 2 D. Just recall that inference is reversed with respect to the usual one, i.e.,
u ‘PLD w means w ‘ u with the usual convention.
Suppose a new formula u is added to a consistent desire base D. As already said,
one cannot desire u and desire :u at the same time without being led to desire
inconsistency. So, if :u 2 D the new desire base becomes inconsistent and should
be revised. Let Du be the result of revising D by u.
Having in mind the reverse behavior of desires with respect to beliefs, one is
naturally led to state for desires axioms that parallel the AGM axioms (Ga¨rdenfors
1988) for belief revision, by in some sense reversing the latter axioms, as follows:
• [(D*1)] for any sentence and any desire set D, Du is a desire set.
• [(D*2)] u 2 Du.
• [(D*3)] Dþu  D

u
11 At least this is so in the book (Ga¨rdenfors 1988) as the epistemic entrenchment is a consequence of the
axioms.
• [(D*4)] If :u 62 D then Du  D
þ
u
• [(D*5)] Du ¼ LPL if and only if u  >
• [(D*6)] If ‘ u  w then Du ¼ D

w
• [(D*7)] Du_w  ðD

uÞ
þ
w
• [(D*8)] If :w 62 Du then D

u_w  ðD

uÞ
þ
w
where the expansion Dþu is just defined by a ‘‘reverse logical closure’’ of D together
with u, in agreement with the intuition underlying the idea of desire:
Dþu ¼ fw j w ‘ D [ fugg ð4Þ
(D*1) is a closure property. (D*2) is a success postulate: the new desire should enter
in the desire set. (D*3) and (D*4) guarantee that the revision is an expansion that
amounts to adding the new desire u to the desire set when :u is not already in the
closure of the desire set. (D*5) states that the revision cannot result into desiring
everything except if the new desire would be to desire everything. (D*6) is the
independence with respect to syntax. (D*7) and (D*8) clearly parallel (D*3) and
(D*4) when revision is decomposed in two steps.
As for guaranteeing the existence of an epistemic entrenchment in belief revision
where the last two AGM axioms are necessary,12 (D*7) and (D*8) are required for
ensuring the existence of a particular desirability relation called ‘‘hedonic
entrenchment’’ in the sense of the postulates of Sect. 4.1. This can be established
following a route very similar to the one of Grove (1988) for epistemic
entrenchment, taking into account the reverse behavior of hedonic entrenchment,
and remembering the very close relationship between sphere systems and possibility
distributions.
Alternatively we can use a formal transformation of a desire base D into another
set of formulas on which the AGM belief revision axioms can be equivalently used
instead of desire revision axioms. Namely from a closed set of desires D we can
construct the closed belief set K ¼ f:u : u 2 Dg. Then AGM representation
theorems can be adapted to the setting of possibilistic desires. For instance, given a
desire base D, and an input u, we can claim that a desire revision operation 
satisfies axioms (D*1-D*8) if and only if there exists a desirability relation  D such
that 8w 2 D;w[ D:w and the revised desire base is of the form
Du ¼ fw : u ^ w[ Du ^ :wg.
Since the approach is syntax-free, it is simpler to write the above axioms in terms
of subsets of possible worlds. Below D and the input A are sets of possible worlds.
DþA is the expanded set, D

A the revised set:
• [(D*1)] Trivial: DA is a set of desired possible worlds.
• [(D*2)] A  DA.
12 In the paper, we use a very restrictive definition of epistemic entrenchment, which is the one in
Ga¨rdenfors (1988), that is, a total preorder relation on the language that obeys specific properties, which
can only be justified if we take the two last AGM axioms for granted. Clearly one could envisage a less
restrictive framework for desire revision, similar to the ones studied by Rott (2001) without (D*7) and
(D*8).
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• [(D*3)] DþA  D

A
• [(D*4)] If A 6 D then DA  D
þ
A
• [(D*5)] DA ¼ W if and only if A ¼ W
• [(D*6)] Trivial (syntax-free approach)
• [(D*7)] DA[B  ðD

AÞ
þ
B
• [(D*8)] If B 62 DA then D

A[B  ðD

AÞ
þ
B
In the set-version,
• one immediately sees that under the axioms but for the two last ones, the
revision rule is of the form:
DA ¼
D [ A if D[A 6¼W :
someC 6¼W ; such thatCA otherwise:

• The two last axioms come from the choice function area, and specify that some
result C  A is selected in agreement with an ordering on W (the most desired
states outside A; Bonanno 2009). But it is not clear what it means in practice.
Either we consider that this setting uses all-or-nothing desires and it is not clear
what the ordering means, or we consider graded desires and it is not clear why
the input should be supposed to be fully desired.
One could think of applying here the maximum specificity principle for desires,
counterpart of the minimum specificity principle in belief representation. Namely,
unless some desire is explicit, one assume states are not desired (i.e., indifferent for
the agent). Under this assumption, C should be A in the above set revision rule
(since there is no desire strength for discriminating the states outside A). This is
clearly too drastic, and highlights the interest of possessing a gradual prior hedonic
distribution, which may guide the desire revision process, just like a possibility
distribution does in the case of beliefs. The next section we investigate desire
revision with explicit desire strengths.
5.2 Belief Revision, Expansion and Contraction in Possibility Theory
It has been pointed out early that the epistemic entrenchment relations underlying
any well-behaved belief revision process obeying AGM postulates (Ga¨rdenfors
1988) are qualitative necessity relations (Dubois and Prade 1991), thus establishing
a link between belief revision and possibility theory (Dubois and Prade 1998). In the
possibility theory view of belief revision, the epistemic entrenchment is explicit and
reflects a confidence-based priority ranking between pieces of information. This
ranking, or equivalently the possibility distribution on interpretations underlying it,
is revised when a new piece of information is received.
We first need to recall the possibilistic expression of conditioning underlying
belief revision. In qualitative possibility theory (Dubois and Prade 1998), a
conditional possibility measure PðBjAÞ is defined, for A 6¼ ;, by means of equation
PðA \ BÞ ¼ minðPðBjAÞ;PðAÞÞ: ð5Þ
In the AGM tradition, no interpretation is impossible, that is, NðAÞ ¼ 1 only if
A ¼ W , or equivalently pðwÞ[ 0; 8w 2 W . The quantitative version would use the
product instead of min, but here we prefer a qualitative setting in agreement with the
modeling assumptions in this paper. Applying the minimum specificity principle
which maximizes the possibility degrees given the constraints (for avoiding arbi-
trary restrictions of the possible states), we get the possibility distribution pðjAÞ
associated with the possibility measure PðjAÞ:
pðwjAÞ ¼
1 if pðwÞ ¼ PðAÞ and w 2 A
pðwÞ if pðwÞ\PðAÞ and w 2 A
0 if w 2 A:
8><
>:
9>=
>;
Conditioning by proposition A acknowledges the fact that according to the input of
the new piece of belief A, states where A is false have become impossible.
In the possibilistic setting, the result of revising the belief base B by input
formula u, is expressed at the semantic level by conditioning the possibility
distribution pB associated with the belief base B (recalled in Sect. 4.4; Dubois and
Prade 1992):
pBuðwÞ ¼ pBðwjAÞ;with A ¼ jjujj:
The revised base is any belief base Bu whose associated possibility distribution is
pBu . A natural choice of B

u, most respectful of the syntax of B, is of the form
(Benferhat et al. 2002b)
Bu ¼ fðui; aiÞ 2 B s.t. ai[ kg [ fðu; 1Þg;
where k ¼ incðB [ fðu; 1ÞgÞ (inconsistency level).
This expression covers the expansion Bþu of B by u as a particular case, letting
A ¼ jjujj:
pBþu ðwÞ ¼ minðpðwÞ; 1AðwÞÞ
provided that the consistency condition coreðpÞ \ A 6¼ ; holds, where
coreðpÞ ¼ fw j pðwÞ ¼ 1g. Syntactically, Bþu ¼ B [ fðu; 1Þg.
Besides, the contraction Bu of B by u is semantically expressed by Dubois and
Prade (1992):
pBu ðwÞ ¼
1 if pðwÞ ¼ PðAÞ and w 62 A
pðwÞ otherwise
( )
:
which ensures :u, with sets of models A, becomes fully possible. Note that in
particular, if PðAÞ ¼ PðAÞ ¼ 1 (which means that we are ignorant about whether u
is true or false), we have pBu ðwÞ ¼ pðwÞ. This is the case as soon asPðAÞ ¼ 1. Note
that we retrieve Harper’s identity as pBu ¼ maxðpB; pB:uÞ (Dubois and Prade 1992).
5.3 Desire Revision, Expansion and Contraction
The conditioning of a guaranteed possibility measure D contrasts with the
conditioning of possibility distributions. It obeys the equation (Benferhat et al. 2002):
DðA \ BÞ ¼ maxðDðBjAÞ;DðAÞÞ: ð6Þ
This equation is easily obtained from (5) using duality, i.e., DðAÞ ¼ NðAÞ ¼
1PðAÞ where the possibility distribution p underlying N and P is taken as 1 d.
Now applying the maximum specificity principle, we get the smallest (i.e.,
corresponding to the least committed conditional desires) possibility distribution
dðwjAÞ obeying (6):
dðwjAÞ ¼
0 if dðwÞ ¼ DðAÞ and w 2 A
dðwÞ if dðwÞ[DðAÞ and w 2 A
1 if w 2 A
8><
>:
9>=
>;:
As can be seen, what is no longer reachable (conditioning by A means that, for some
reason, the possible states are restricted to be those where A is true) is fully desirable
by default (DðAjAÞ ¼ 1), while A is no longer desired (DðAjAÞ ¼ 0) because the
conditioning set A assumes that the current world lies in A; besides, desired worlds
in A with strength strictly above DðAÞ are preserved. So, conditioning means that for
some reason, the possible states are restricted to be those in A thus limiting the set of
possible worlds, but clearly it does not mean acquiring a new desire. While the
revision of a set of beliefs B by a formula u exactly corresponds to the conditioning
of pB by A ¼ jjujj, this is no longer the case with respect to desirability functions,
for the revision of a set of desires by a new one.
Let d be a desirability function. While, in the possibility setting, a belief input
A is taken to mean that all the elements in A should be impossible, a desire input
A means that all states in A should be desirable after revision, in agreement with our
logical framework for desires, i.e., DAðAÞ ¼ minw2A d

AðwÞ ¼ 1. Since conditioning
is such that DðAjAÞ ¼ 0 and DðAjAÞ ¼ 1, it does not fit with this requirement. As the
agent now desires such states in A, it should enforce DAðAÞ ¼ 0.
Due to this change of focus from A to A, when moving from beliefs to desires,
desire revision is better expressed by:
dAðwÞ ¼ dðwjAÞ
This leads to
dAðwÞ ¼
0 if dðwÞ ¼ DðAÞ and w 2 A
dðwÞ if dðwÞ[DðAÞ and w 2 A
1 if w 2 A
8><
>:
9>=
>;:
As can be seen we have DAðAÞ ¼ 0 and D

AðAÞ ¼ 1.
The condition DAðAÞ ¼ 1 may be considered as too strong an expression of the
success postulate when revising the desirability function d by the new desire A.
Introducing a new desire does not necessarily mean that the new desire should be
desired with the highest strength. As revision is a merging of two entities of the
same nature, we may prefer considering revision by a mild constraint such as
D

AðAÞ a (rather than D

AðAÞ ¼ 1). This leads to a variant of the revision operator:
dðA;aÞðwÞ ¼
0 if dðwÞ ¼ DðAÞ and w 2 A
dðwÞ if dðwÞ[DðAÞ and w 2 A
a if w 2 A and dðwÞ\a
dðwÞ if w 2 A and dðwÞ a
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
:
It can be checked that we now have DAðAÞ ¼ a.
We may also think of weakening the success postulate into DAðAÞ[ 0. It can be
defined by taking lesson of what is done in belief revision, where this corresponds to
the idea of natural revision in the sense of Boutilier (1993); see Benferhat et al.
(2001). When using a finite scale, we have just to take a as the smallest non-zero
value in the scale.
The expansion of a set of desires D by u amounts to cumulating desire u with the
desires in D, providing that the result is not the desire of everything to some extent
(due to the postulate Dð>Þ ¼ 0). Thus, we have at the semantic level, with input
A ¼ jjujj, with characteristic function 1A:
dþA ðwÞ ¼ maxðdDðwÞ; 1AðwÞÞ
provided that supportðdÞ [ A 6¼ W , where supportðdÞ ¼ fwjdDðwÞ[ 0g. Note that
dA ¼ d
þ
A in this case.
The contraction of D by u amounts to no longer desire u at all after
contraction. Thus, we have at the semantic level, with input A ¼ jjujj:
dA ðwÞ ¼
0 if dðwÞ ¼ DðAÞ and w 2 A
dðwÞ otherwise
 
:
In particular, we have dA ðwÞ ¼ dðwÞ; 8w as soon as DðAÞ ¼ 0.
Let us illustrate the approach by an example.
Example 2 Let D ¼ f½u ^ w; a
; ½m; b
g be a desire base where a[ b, where
u;w; m are literals. Applying Eq. (4), we get its semantical counterpart under the
form of a desirability function d:
dðuwmÞ ¼ dðuw:mÞ ¼ a;
dðu:wmÞ ¼ dð:uwmÞ ¼ dð:u:wmÞ ¼ b;
dðu:w:mÞ ¼dð:uw:mÞ ¼ dð:u:w:mÞ ¼ 0:
Clearly, unaðDÞ ¼ 0. Now, assume we want to add desire ½:u; 1
. Let us compute
d:u. We get:
d:uð:uwmÞ ¼ d

:uð:u:wmÞ ¼ d

:uð:uw:mÞ ¼ d

:uð:u:w:mÞ ¼ 1ðmodels of :uÞ
d:uðuwmÞ ¼ d

:uðuw:mÞ ¼ a; d

:uðu:wmÞ ¼ b;
d:uðu:w:mÞ ¼ 0; which remain unchanged.
Observe that unaðD [ f½:u; 1
gÞ ¼ 0, which means that after addition of the new
desire, the set of desires remains acceptable. In fact, we have just performed an
expansion here so d:u is the desirability function for f½u ^ w; a
; ½m; b
; ½:u; 1
g.
Now suppose we only add the desire ½:u; c
. Then the modified part of d would
be now
d:uð:uwmÞ ¼ d

:uð:u:wmÞ ¼ maxðb; cÞ; d

:uð:uw:mÞ ¼ d

:uð:u:w:mÞ ¼ c:
Suppose now the new desire is ½:m; 
 and the new desire base
f½u ^ w; a
; ½m;b
; ½:m; 
g.
The corresponding desirability function for this expansion is dþ½:m;
 such that
dþ½:m;
ðuwmÞ ¼ a;
dþ½:m;
ðu:wmÞ ¼ d
þ
½:m;
ð:uwmÞ ¼ d
þ
½:m;
ð:u:wmÞ ¼ b;
dþ½:m;
ðu:w:mÞ ¼ d
þ
½:m;
ð:uw:mÞ ¼ d
þ
½:m;
ð:u:w:mÞ ¼ 
and dþ½:m;
ðuw:mÞ ¼ maxða; Þ:
Thus unaðD [ f½:m; 
gÞ ¼ minða; b; Þ ¼ minðb; Þ ¼ b assuming [ b (the new
desire is stronger than some of the other desires in D).
We must perform a revision. The result d½:m;
 of the revision is such that the
strength b of those least desired interpretations is decreased to 0:
d½:m;
ðu:wmÞ ¼ d

½:m;
ð:uwmÞ ¼ d

½:m;
ð:u:wmÞ ¼ 0
while for the other interpretations, we keep d½:m;
ðwÞ ¼ d
þ
½:m;
ðwÞ. h
It is easy to write for desire revision the counterpart of the axioms for belief
revision presented in the previous section in terms of sets of possible worlds.
Namely
• [(D*1)] For any input A, dA represents a hedonic state.
• [(D*2)] DAðAÞ ¼ 1. This a (strong) priority to the new desire.
• [(D*3)] dþA is not more specific than d

A
• [(D*4)] If DðAÞ ¼ 0 then dA d
þ
A
• [(D*5)] dA ¼ 1 if and only if A ¼ W
• [(D*7)] dA[B ðd

AÞ
þ
B
• [(D*8)] If DAðBÞ ¼ 0 then d

A[Bðd

AÞ
þ
B
(D*2) may be weakened into DAðAÞ[ 0. The above properties (D
1 D*8) extend
(D1 D8) to the revision of a hedonic distribution d, but fail to uniquely
characterize it. However, it is routine to check that the conditioning-based revision
operation dA in this section obeys properties (D
1 D8). These axioms are the
exact counterpart of the axioms for gradual belief revision (Dubois and Prade 1992).
It could be checked that they result from a simple exchange with the latter, under a
transformation corresponding to the formal identity DdðAÞ ¼ N1dðAÞ, where Dd
(resp. N1d) is the guaranteed possibility (resp. necessity) measure defined from the
distribution d (resp. 1 d). However they do not characterize a unique possibilistic
revision operation for desires, as it is the case with the possibilistic revision
operation for belief (Dubois and Prade 1992).
Analogously to the belief revision case, a syntactic counterpart of desire revision
can be performed. It can be checked that only the desires strictly above the level of
unacceptability of the expanded desire base with the new input are preserved:
Du ¼ f½ui; ai
 2 D s.t. ai[ unaðD [ f½u; a
gÞg [ f½u; a
g;
the others being lost.
Example 3 Let D ¼ f½u; a
; ½m; b
g with a[ b, where unaðDÞ ¼ 0 obviously.
Now, let us add desire ½:u; 1
. We have unaðD [ f½:u; 1
gÞ ¼ a and then
D:u ¼ f½:u; 1
g.
Consider now D0 ¼ f½u; b
; ½m; a
g (always with a[ b). Then, observe that
unaðD0 [ f½:u; 1
gÞ ¼ b, and D0:u ¼ f½m; a
; ½:u; 1
g. h
Similarly, for the desire base D used in Example 2, it can be checked that
D:u ¼ D:
þ
u, and the expansion comes down to adding ½u; 1
 to the base. Moreover, 
the revision by ½:m; 
 did yield D½:m;
 ¼ f½u; a
; ½:m; 
g assuming  [ b. This
revision enforces unaðD½:m;
Þ ¼ 0.
Note that in all the above examples, we have assumed that none of the 
interpretations induced by the language used for specifying the desire set is 
impossible. This assumption is similar to the one underlying epistemic entrench-
ments in the AGM theory. In any case, if such an impossibility exists for some of 
them, this has to be taken into account by means of integrity constraints, for instance 
excluding rejected interpretations corresponding to negative desires.
6 Conclusion
The paper has presented a logical approach to the modeling of hedonic states and to 
the revision of desires. It is worth noticing that this topic has been little considered 
in the literature before. Although the ‘D’ of ‘BDI agents’ refers to desires, there 
have been very few works until now aiming at modeling desires (independently of 
goals) in a formal way (see Casali et al. 2011 for a noticeable exception). Desiring a 
state of affairs is potential, i.e., the fact of longing for a better situation regardless of 
its actual feasibility, thus distinguishing desires from goals to actually pursue. Goals 
are desires that have been actualized by the agent and to which she is committed. 
Their revision is not the same problem as the one of desire revision, and is in fact 
quite similar to belief revision (since achieving goal u and achieving goal w should
be the same as achieving both goals, i.e., u ^ w). The revision of a set of prioritized
goals should be based on a volitive entrenchment, formally similar to an epistemic
entrenchment.
The specific nature of desires with respect to beliefs has also been advocated and
emphasized. Roughly speaking, desires behave in a reverse way compared to
beliefs. This is reflected in the different series of axioms characterizing desirability
functions, inference from a set of desires, and also axioms for desire revision that
have been proposed in this paper. Several directions remain to investigate, such as
studying iterated desire revision. Another issue would be to allow, as outlined in
Casali et al. (2011), for a separate handling of desires asserted positively, and
desires asserted negatively (as expressing rejections) by means of two distinct
functions, one expressing desirability and the other undesirability (rather than using
a unique function as in our approach). Indeed, possibility theory is equipped with
proper formal tools to handle positive and negative aspects separately, but
consistently as outlined in (Dubois and Prade 2009b). It would mean adding, to a
desire base, a base of (more or less) compulsory requirements meant to avoid fearful
situations, and reasoning from these two sets of information items.
Besides, it is known that belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning are two
sides of the same coin (Ga¨rdenfors 1990; Rott 2001). This remains to be checked for
nonmonotonic desires (Dubois et al. 2014) and desires revision. Actually, we plan
to extend the static modal logic of belief and desire we proposed in Dubois et al.
(2013) by dynamic operators of belief revision and desire revision. This will provide
a unified modal logic framework based on possibility theory dealing with both the
static and the dynamic aspects of beliefs and desires, to be compared with the
proposal made in Lang et al. (2003).
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